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comparative study on the two pieces of law, this paper intends to dig out the similarities and
differences between them and develop some suggestions for the improvement of them.
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Chapter I. Introduction

Since the development of international trade theory,1 trade barriers have been the most
enduring foci in the area of international trade law. As is known to all, trade liberalization
promotes global prosperity and welfare. However, the incentive to be free riders in the process
of trade liberalization tempts almost all countries to maintain some kind of trade barriers, which
gives rise to numerous disputes among these nations. The settlement of such disputes is within
the domain of public international law, where only States have standing.2 However, the private
sector and the public authorities could form an ad-hoc partnership in the fight against foreign
trade barriers so as to promote the accomplishment of their respective objectives. 3 By
establishing a legal procedure for the private sector to petition their government to challenge
foreign trade barriers, the Trade Barriers Regulation4 (hereinafter TBR) in the European Union

1

2
3
4

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 260-362 (J.R.M’culloch
ed., Edinburgh : A. and C. Black and London : Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans 1850) (1776);
DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 108-27 (E.C.K Conner ed., G. BE.U. &
Sons, Ltd. 1911) (1817).
In WTO dispute settlement system, independent customs territories like Hong Kong also have standing to
file a complaint.
GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS——PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION 12-18, 33
(2003).
Council Regulation 3286/94 of 22 December 1994 Laying Down Community Procedures in the Field of the
Common Commercial Policy in Order to Ensure the Exercise of the Community's Rights Under
International Trade Rules, in Particular Those Established Under the Auspices of the World Trade
Organization, 1994 O.J. (L349) 71 (EC), as amended by Council Regulation 356/95 of 20 February 1995,
1995 O.J. (L041) 3 (EC). For the similarities and differences between the TBR and its U.S. counterpartSection 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, please refer to Professor Shaffer’s book at supra note 3.

2
and the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules 5 in China are aimed to forge such
partnership.
This paper will undertake a comparative study on the two pieces of law in the following
aspects: Chapter two provides an overview of the laws, including their background, aims, scope
and decision-making, etc. Chapter three examines the procedure from lodging a complaint to
carrying out an investigation. Substantive requirements are explored in Chapter four. Chapter
five discusses the outcome of the investigation and follow up actions or measures. This is
followed by an introduction of judicial review available for the complainants and other persons
concerned. An overview and evaluation of the implementation of the law is taken up in Chapter
seven. The paper ends up with some suggestions on the improvement of the law.

5

Dui Wai Mao Yi Bi Lei Diao Cha Gui Ze［Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules］(promulagted
by the Ministry of Commerce, Feb. 2, 2005, effective Mar. 1, 2005) LAWINFOCHINA ( last visited Mar. 15,
2006) (P.R.C.).
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Chapter II. An Overview

A. Trade Barriers Regulation6 in the European Union
As a key element of the EU Market Access Strategy,7 the TBR is unique among the
Community’s commercial policy instruments because of its offensive nature.8 It is aimed at
opening third country markets for European exporters rather than merely defending the
Community market.9 The TBR is a successor of the New Commercial Policy Instrument10
(hereinafter NCPI) in which the Community industry was allowed for the first time to lodge a
complaint with the Commission about an unfair foreign trade barrier. Under the TBR, the
private rights were further

6

strengthened

with

the

addition

of Community enterprises as

Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4.
The Market Access Strategy was introduced in 1996, which marked a transition in the E.U. from a
defensive trade policy to a proactive and aggressive trade policy. See Communication from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions, The Global Challenge of International Trade: A Market Access Strategy for the
European Union, COM (1996) 53 final (Feb. 14, 1996).
8
Apart from other commercial policy instruments like anti-dumping and safeguards measures, the TBR is
aimed to remove obstacles to trade which have an effect on third countries market as well as on the
Community market.
9
See Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 1.
10
Council Regulation 2641/84 of 17 September 1984 on the Strengthening of the Common Commercial
Policy with Regard in Particular to Protection against Illicit Commercial Practices, art. 3, 1984 O.J. (L252)
1(EC).
7
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complainants.11 With big improvements, the TBR is designed to be more effective than its
predecessor – the NCPI.12
The TBR covers obstacles to trade in goods as well as services.13 In practice, measures on
trade related intellectual property are also the target of TBR.14 The Council shall decide on the
adoption of commercial policy measures.15 The Commission shall decide on all the other issues,
including the initiation, suspension or termination of TBR proceedings, and initiation, conduct
or termination of international consultation or dispute settlement procedures.16

Upon the

request of Member States, the Commission decisions may be revised by the Council by a
qualified majority.17 Overall, the Commission plays a leading role in the administration of the
TBR.18

11

12
13
14

15
16
17
18

Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 4. For the difference between the “Community industry”
and “Community enterprise”, please refer to the definitions of them contained in the article 2.5 and 2.6 of
the TBR.
Council Regulation 2641/84, supra note 10.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 2.
See Commission Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade, within
the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94, Consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by Canada
in relation to Certain Geographical Indications for Wines, 2002 O.J. (C124) 6; Commission Notice of
initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade, within the Meaning of Council
Regulation (EC) No 3286/94, Consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by the United States of America in
Relation to Cross-border Music Licensing, 1997 O.J. (C177) 5.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 13.3.
Id. at art. 13.1, 13.2.
Id. at art.14.4.
Marco Bronckers & Natalie Mcnelis, The EU Trade Barriers Regulation Comes of Age, 35(4) J. OF WORLD
TRADE 427, 444 (2001).
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B. Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules19 in China

The People’s Republic of China adopted “opening up” policy in the late 1970s and has
already gained tremendous development in the area of foreign trade.20 In the international
market, Chinese products are very competitive, with relatively low prices. Therefore, Chinese
products have become the most frequent target of anti-dumping measures adopted by trade
partners. According to the statistical data released by the World Trade Organization (hereinafter
WTO) Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, there were 411 anti-dumping investigations
initiated against Chinese products from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2004.21 In the
meantime, Chinese products are confronted with various trade barriers set up by foreign
countries that wish to protect their domestic market.

Having adopted a defensive strategy for a

long period, the Chinese government decided to turn the scale by resorting to a more offensive
trade policy instrument. Consequently, the Provisional Rules for the Investigation of Foreign
Trade Barriers22 was promulgated in September 2002 by the former Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation.23 Unfortunately, no investigation has ever been initiated under it.24

19
20

21

22

23

24

Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5.
See XIAOLAN FU, EXPORTS, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, 45-46
(2004); Chengyan Lu, Legal Services in China: Facing the WTO, 20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 278,
282(2003).
Anti-Dumping Initiations: By Exporting Country,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_stattab1_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
Dui Wai Mao Yi Bi Lei Diao Cha Zan Xing Gui Ze［Provisional Rules for the Investigation of
Foreign Trade Barriers］(promulgated by the former Ministry of Foreign Trade an Econ. Cooperation,
Sep. 23, 2002, effective Nov. 1, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 15, 2006) (P.R.C.).
The former Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation was incorporated into the current
Ministry of Commerce in March 2003. They are both branches within the State Council. Currently, the
Ministry of Commerce is the authority in charge of foreign trade in China.
Legislation on Foreign Trade Barriers in China,
http://gpj.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/xxfb/a/200504/20050400034765.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).

6
A bigger change occurred in July 2004 with the amendment of the Foreign Trade Law,25 which
is the basic law immediately below the Constitution governing foreign trade in China. In a
newly inserted chapter entitled “Foreign Trade Investigation”, foreign trade barriers are listed
among the issues for investigation.26 In three articles, this short chapter concisely provides the
authority, the methods of investigation, obligation of publication and confidentiality of state
secrets and commercial secrets.27 In the following year, the Ministry of Commerce, as the
authority in charge of foreign trade, promulgated the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation
Rules28 in order to implement the relevant provisions in the Foreign Trade Law.29 The Rules
provide the procedure in detail for the investigation of foreign trade barriers.
Like the TBR, the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules covers obstacles to trade
both in goods and services.30 The Ministry of Commerce is the decision-making body under
the Rules.31 It designates the Bureau of Fair Trade of Import and Export, one of its branches,
for the implementation of the Rules.32

25

26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Dui Wai Mao Yi Fa［Foreign Trade Law］(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., May
12, 1994, amended by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 6, 2004, effective Jul. 1, 2004) 2004
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 4 (P.R.C.).
Id. at art. 37-39.
Id.
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5.
Foreign Trade Law, supra note 25, at art. 37-39.
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5, at art.3.
Id. at art. 2.
Id.

7
C. Comparison

Both of the two pieces of law were enacted in line with the trade policy transition from
defensive to offensive in the EU and China. They share the same objective, namely, removing
unfair trade barriers so as to expand exportation.33 They both cover obstacles to trade in goods
and services.34 The question of whether the measures on trade related intellectual property shall
be covered is answered by the TBR practice, but it is still unclear under the Foreign Trade
Barriers Investigation Rules.
One problem with the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules is that its status is too
low. In China, the Constitution is at the top of the hierarchy of law.35 The second tier is the law
enacted by the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.36 This is followed by
regulations issued by the State Council.37 The fourth tier is the local law and regulations issued
by the local People’s Congress and its Standing Committee.38 Local rules issued by the local
government are at the lowest tier.39 In addition, the regulations issued by the departments of
State Council have the same status as the local rules issued by local government.40 The
relationship between the regulations issued by the departments of State Council and local law
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40

Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5, at art.1; Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note
4, at art. 1.
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5, at art.3; Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note
4, at art. 2.1.
Li fa fa［Law on Legislation］(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000,
effective July 1, 2000) art. 78, 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 112 (P.R.C.).
Id. at art. 79.
Id.
Id. at art. 80.
Id.
Id. at art.82. When conflict exists between the two, the State Council shall determine which of them
prevails. See Id. at art. 86.3.
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and regulations issued by the local People’s Congress and its Standing Committee is not clearly
defined. It is up to the State Council and the Standing Committee of National People’s Congress
to resolve the conflict that might exist between the two. 41 The Foreign Trade Barriers
Investigation Rules is promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, one of the departments of the
State Council.42 Therefore, its status is lower than the Constitution, laws and regulations issued
by the State Council. Accordingly, it has to concede when conflict occurs between it and any of
the three sources of law in the higher hierarchy. In contrast, the other two most frequently used
trade policy instruments- anti-dumping and countervailing measures- are governed by
regulations issued by the State Council.43 This reflects that foreign trade barrier investigations
have not yet been deemed as important as anti-dumping and countervailing measures.

41
42
43

Id. at art. 86.2.
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5.
Fan Qin Xiao Tiao Li［Anti-Dumping Regulation］(promulgated by the St. Council, Nov. 26, 2001,
amended by the St. Council, Mar. 31, 2004, effective June 1, 2004) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 15,
2006); Fan Bu Tie Tiao Li［Countervailing Regulation］(promulgated by the St. Council, Oct. 31, 2001,
amended by the St. Council, Mar. 31, 2004, effective June 1, 2004) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 15,
2006).
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Chapter III. Procedure

A. Trade Barriers Regulation44 in the European Union

1. Lodging of a complaint
There are three types of complainants under the TBR,45 namely, the Community industry,
the Community enterprise and the Member States.46 The complaint should be in written form
and submitted to the Commission.47
A complaint on behalf of the Community industry must contain sufficient evidence for the
existence of “obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market of the Community”48 and of
the “injury resulting therefrom.”49 This avenue represents the defensive side of the TBR.50
The complaint on behalf of Community enterprises must contain sufficient evidence for
the existence of “obstacles to trade that have an effect on the market of a third country”51 and
of the “adverse trade effects resulting therefrom.”52 This track represents the offensive side of

44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4.
Id. art. 3, 4, 6.
Id. at art. 3, 4, 5.
Id. at art. 3.1, 4.1, 5.1.
Id. at art. 3.1.
Id. at art. 3.2.
Jean Charles Van Eeckhaute, Private Complaints against Foreign Unfair Trade Practices: The EC’s Trade
Barriers Regulation, 33(6) J. OF WORLD TRADE 199, 201 (1999).
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 4.1.
Id. at art. 4.2.
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the TBR.53 Nevertheless, such a complaint is admissible only if the obstacle to trade alleged
therein is the subject of a right of action provided in a multilateral or plurilateral trade
agreement.54 Therefore, the Community enterprises are excluded from lodging complaints
based on bilateral agreements between the Community and third countries.55
The Member States may lodge a complaint in both of the situations mentioned above.56
The complaint filed by the Member States must contain sufficient evidence regarding the
“obstacles to trade and of any effects resulting therefrom.”57
To date, only one investigation has been based on a complaint lodged on behalf of
Community industry.58 Three investigations have been based on complaints lodged on behalf
of Community industry and enterprises together.59 All the other investigations have been based
on complaints lodged on behalf of Community enterprises, among which only three have been

53

Eeckhaute, supra note 50, at 203.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 4.1.
55
See Bronckers, supra note 18, at 434-45; CROWELL & MORING, INTERIM EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION’S TRADE BARRIERS REGULATION 79-80 (2005),
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/october/tradoc_125451.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
56
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 6.1.
57
Id. at art. 6.2.
58
Commission Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade, within
the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94, Consisting of Subsidies Afforded by the United
States of America to Oilseed Production, 2003 O.J. (C58) 3.
59
Commission Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade, within
the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94, Consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by Korea
Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels, 2000 O.J. (C345) 5; Commission Notice of Initiation of an
Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade within the Meaning of Council Regulation (EC)
No 3286/94, Consisting of the — Brazilian Export Financing Programme PROEX, 1999 O.J. (C108) 33;
Commission Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade, within the
Meaning of Council Regulation (EC) No 3286/94, Consisting of Trade Practices Maintained by Chile in
Relation to the Transit and Transhipment of Swordfish in Chilean Ports, 1998 O.J. (C215) 2.
54

11
lodged by companies themselves while the others have been filed by associations representing
enterprises.60 Complaints filed by the Member States have never happened.61

2. Commission’s decision on admissibility

Normally, the Commission shall make a decision on the initiation of a Community
examination procedure within 45 days of the lodging of the complaint.62 This period may be
suspended at the request, or with the agreement, of the complainant.63 There are two elements
the Commission shall consider before making a decision, namely, whether the evidence is
sufficient and whether the initiation of an examination procedure is “necessary in the interest
of the Community.” 64 In order to provide the Commission with consultations on the
decision-making, an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives of all the Member
States is set up pursuant to the TBR. 65 The Commission’s decision of initiating an
examination procedure shall be announced in the Official Journal of the European
Communities.66

60
61
62
63
64
65
66

All the investigations are listed in the annex.
Id.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 5.4.
Id.
Id. at art. 8.1.
Id. at art.7.
Id. at art. 8.1(a).
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3. Investigation and report to Member States
The investigation is carried out at the Community level.67 There are several ways to gather
and verify the information. The Commission shall request information from all relevant
economic operators and organizations who give their consent. 68 Where necessary, the
Commission shall carry out investigations in the territory of third countries, which have been
officially notified and expressed no objection within a reasonable period.69 Upon request, the
Member States shall supply the Commission with all information necessary for the
investigation.70 The Commission may hold a hearing upon the written request of the parties
concerned. 71 Furthermore, the Commission shall, on request, give the parties primarily
concerned an opportunity to be confronted with each other for verification of information.72
During the investigation, confidential information shall be accorded with special treatment.73
Upon conclusion of the investigation, the Commission shall report to the Committee. 74
Normally, the investigation shall end within five months of the announcement of initiation of
the procedure, which could be extended to seven months due to the complexity of the
examination.75 In practice, the average period of investigations is nine months.76

67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at art. 8.1(c).
Id. at art.8.2(a).
Id. at art.8.2(b).
Id. at art. 8.3.
Id. at art.8.5.
Id. at art.8.6.
Id. at art. 8.4(a).
Id. at art. 8.8.
Id.
CROWELL & MORING, INTERIM EVALUATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S TRADE BARRIERS REGULATION 104
(2005), http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/october/tradoc_125451.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2006).
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As trade barriers tend to become ever more complicated, the investigation has become
increasingly important.77 Within the rule-oriented WTO dispute settlement mechanism, the
more detailed facts one country collects, the more possibility for the country to win the case.78

4. The procedural rights of industry or enterprises as complainants

Under the TBR, complainants are fully involved in every stage of the investigation and
have broad procedural rights.79 They are entitled to have their complaints duly examined as
regards the sufficiency of evidence.80 If the complaints are found admissible, an investigation
shall be initiated on the allegations of the complaint.81 Complainants have the right to inspect
non-confidential information and be informed of the result of the procedure.82 Moreover, they
can resort to judicial review when they disagree with decisions of the Commission.83 Once a
trade barrier is found to exist, the complainants are guaranteed that action shall be taken against
it.84
Moreover, the importers or exporters concerned, other than the complainants, also have
certain procedural rights. They have the right to inspect the non-confidential information that is
used in the examination procedure and is relevant to the protection of their interests.85 They

77
78
79
80
81
82
83

84
85

Eeckhaute, supra note 50, at 205.
SHAFFER, supra note 3, at 46-47.
Eeckhaute, supra note 50, at 206.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art.5.4.
Id. at art.8.
Id. at art. 5.3, 8.1(a), 8.4(a).
Treaty Establishing the European Communities, art. 230, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C340) 3 ［hereinafter
EC Treaty］.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art.12.
Id. at art.8.4.
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also have the right to be heard by the Commission provided that they prove that they are
primarily concerned with the result of the procedure.86
B. Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules87 in China

1. Filing a complaint

Complaints can be brought either by domestic enterprises, industries or any individual,
legal persons or other entities on behalf of them.

88

The complaint shall be in written form and

include the following information: 89 ⑴ name, address and related information of the
complainant;90 ⑵ the description of measures or practices concerned;

91

⑶ the description of

the products or service that the measures or practices concerned aim at; 92 ⑷ a general
description of relevant domestic industries; 93 ⑸ a description of negative impacts if the
measures or ways applied for investigation have caused negative impacts;94 ⑹ other content
that the complainant deems it necessary to include.95 Complainants are also required to provide
evidence of the existence of the measures or practices and the negative impact caused

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at art.8.5.
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5.
Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art.6.
Id. at art.7.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

thereby.
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If the complainant cannot submit the materials, it does not necessarily lead to the rejection of
the complaint. However, the complainant should explain the reason in written form.96
Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce also can self-initiate investigations against foreign
trade barriers as it deems necessary.97
The only investigation so far was initiated upon a complaint filed by Jiangsu Province
Laver Association.98

2. Examination of the complaint

The Ministry of Commerce shall examine complaints and make a decision on whether or
not to initiate an investigation within 60 days from the receipt of the complaints.99 If the
complaint meets the requirement of the form and content, the Ministry of Commerce shall
initiate an investigation thereby and publish a corresponding announcement, which shall
include the measures or practices under investigation, the products or services relating to the
measures and practices under investigation, the alleged country (region), and the time limit for
the interested parties to set forth their opinions and the public to make comments.100 The
complainant is entitled to be informed of the Ministry of Commerce’s decision to initiate an
investigation. 101 The Ministry of Commerce may make a decision not to initiate an

96

Id. at art.8.
Id. at art.4.
98
The Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 16, 2004, Initiation of an Investigation on Japan
Restriction Measures of Laver Importation (Apr. 22, 2004),
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/b/e/200404/20040400212097.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
99
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5, at art.10.
100
Id. at art.12,13.
101
Id. at art.14.
97

16
investigation in one of the following circumstances: ⑴ the complaint is apparently
inconsistent with the facts;102 ⑵ the materials submitted by the complainant are incomplete
and the complainant does not provide supplementary materials within the time limit set by the
Ministry of Commerce;103 ⑶ the measures or practices involved are obviously not a trade
barrier as defined; 104 or ⑷ other circumstances that the Ministry of Commerce deems
unnecessary to initiate an investigation.105

3. Investigation

There are several ways for the Ministry of Commerce to carry out an investigation. It may
collect the information itself.106 It may establish an expert consultation group consisting of
relevant departments of the State Council, experts and scholars it deems necessary for the
investigation on technical and legal issues.107 It may seek information from the interested
parties through questionnaires or hearings. 108 When it deems necessary, the Ministry of
Commerce may also send staff to the country (region) concerned to collect information upon
the agreement of its government.109 During the investigation, the Ministry of Commerce may
request consultation with the country (region) concerned.

102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110

Id. at art.16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at art.19.
Id. at art.20.
Id. at art.21.
Id. at art.22.
Id. at art.25.

110

The

investigation

shall

be
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finished within six months of the announcement of the initiation of the investigation. This
period may be extended for no more than three months under special circumstances.111

4. Procedural rights

Complainants’ procedural rights are guaranteed by the Foreign Trade Barriers
Investigation Rules. They have the right to have their complaints duly reviewed by the Ministry
of Commerce.112 They are ensured that an investigation be initiated if their complaints satisfy
the requirement.113 They have the right to be informed of the Ministry of Commerce’s decision
on the initiation of an investigation.114
In addition, interested parties also have certain procedural rights. They have the right to be
informed the Ministry of Commerce’s decision on initiating an investigation.115 They are
entitled to asking the Ministry of Commerce to keep confidential the materials they submit.116
In practice, interested parties have the right of access to the non-confidential version of
complaints and evidentiary materials at the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports.117

C. Comparison

The most noticeable characteristic in both of the two procedures is their accessibility to
enterprises and industry. This access demonstrates the public authorities’ intention of forging
111
112
113
114
115
116
117

Id. at art.32.
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Id. at art.12.
Id. at art.13.
Id. at art.13.
Id. at art.23,24.
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public-private partnership so as to promote international trade negotiation and dispute
settlement. On the one hand, the public authorities benefit from the private sector’s
informational and financial resources. On the other hand, the private sector is given a track to
press the public authorities to defend their interests.118 Besides, the two procedures have
similar stages with definite time limits, similar investigation means are employed in the two
procedures, both of the two procedures seek transparency, and, the complainants and other
parties concerned are granted procedural rights in both of the two procedures.
The biggest difference between the two procedures lies in the standards for complainants’
burden of proof. In comparison, the complainants’ burden of proof is lower under the Foreign
Trade Barriers Investigation Rules.119 There are two main reasons. First, Chinese enterprises
tend to be more wary of litigation. Too strict requirements for the complaint would further
restrain their enthusiasm to use the procedure. Second, Chinese enterprises’ possession of
resources and expertise is currently limited so that it is impractical to impose on them heavy
responsibilities on the preparation of complaints and evidence collection. Nevertheless, the
private sector is still motivated to participate actively in order to persuade the authority to
defend its interest. For example, the Ministry of Commerce may decide not to initiate an
investigation if the materials submitted by the complainant are incomplete and the complainant
does not provide supplementary materials within the time limit.120 The Ministry of Commerce
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Id. at art.16.

19
may also terminate the investigation if the complainant does not provide appropriate
cooperation during the investigation.121
Several defects are distinct in the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules. Although
there are several provisions concerning the rights of interested parties in the Rules, there is no
definition for the term “interested parties”. Furthermore, interested parties are not guaranteed a
chance to provide information since the Ministry of Commerce is not obligated to hold a
hearing during the investigation.122

121
122

Id. at art.30.
Id. at art.21.
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Chapter IV. Substantive Requirements

A. Trade Barriers Regulation123 in the European Union

The substantive requirements in the TBR include: qualifications for the complainants,
obstacles to trade, and injury or adverse trade effects resulting from the obstacles to trade.

1. The qualification for the complainants
As mentioned before, there are three kinds of complainants under the TBR. They are
Community industry, Community enterprises and Member States.
“Community industry” is defined in the following four situations: (1) all Community
producers or providers of products or services “identical or similar to the product or service
which is the subject of an obstacle to trade”;124 (2) all Community producers or providers of
products or services “competing directly with” the product or service that is the subject of an
obstacle to trade; 125 (3) all Community producers or providers who are “consumers or
processors of the product or consumers or users of the service which is the subject of an
obstacle to trade”; 126 or (4) all those producers or providers whose “combined output
constitutes a major proportion of total Community production of the products or services in
123
124
125
126
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question.”127 Nevertheless, there are two exceptions to the requirement that industry include
all producers or providers. First, when producers or providers are “related to the exporters or
importers or are themselves importers of the product or service alleged to be the subject of
obstacles to trade,” “Community industry” may be interpreted as the rest of the producers or
providers.128 Second, when the effect of the obstacle to trade is concentrated in one Member
State or some Member States, the producers or providers within a region of the Community
may be regarded as the Community industry if their collective output constitutes the “major
proportion of the output of the product or service in question” in that Member State or
Member States.129
“Community enterprise” means a Community company or firm “directly concerned by the
production of goods or the provision of services” which are the subject of the obstacle to
trade.130 A Community company or firm refers to a company or firm that is formed in
accordance with the law of a Member State and has its registered office, central administration
or principal place of business within the Community.131
Obviously, the quantitative requirement for the term “Community industry” is much more
strict. Such difference leads to different standards of burden of proof imposed upon Community
industry and Community enterprises, which will be examined below.
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2. Obstacles to trade

The TBR defines “obstacles to trade” as “any trade practice adopted or maintained by a
third country in respect of which international trade rules establish a right of action.”132 Such a
right of action exists “when international trade rules either prohibit a practice outright, or give
another party affected by the practice a right to seek elimination of the effect of the practice in
question.”133 The first situation refers to violation of international trade rules. The second
situation falls squarely within the category of non-violation complaints under the WTO rules,134
demonstrating the TBR’s strategic link with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
The TBR contains no definition for “trade practice”. In reality, legislative measures have
been the most frequent target for the complaints lodged under TBR.135 Administrative practices
have also been subject to investigations.136 Furthermore, the TBR is targeted at “any trade
practice adopted or maintained by a third country.”137 In other words, the TBR is directed
against government practices rather than private practices.138
To date, all the investigations under the TBR have been centered on trade practices that the
complainants alleged to be violations of WTO agreements.139 No investigation has ever been
132
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Id.
134
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initiated upon allegation of injuries or adverse trade effects caused by trade practices that do not
conflict with international trade rules. The types of trade practices in the past cases cover
import/export restrictions, internal discrimination, intellectual property rights protection,
subsidies, retaliatory measures, restrictions on transit and trade remedy measures.140

3. Injury

The complaint lodged on behalf of the Community industry shall contain sufficient
evidence of the injury caused by the obstacles to trade.141 The TBR defines “injury” as “any
material injury which an obstacle to trade causes or threatens to cause, in respect of a product or
service, to a Community industry on the market of the Community.”142 The factors that shall be
considered in the determination of injury include: (a) the Community imports or exports
volume; 143 (b) the prices of the Community industry’s competitors;144 (c) the consequent
impact on the Community industry.145 As regards the threat of injury, the Commission shall
examine “whether it is clearly foreseeable”146 that actual injury will be developed.
U.S.—Subsidies on oilseed production147 is the only case purely based on the allegation of
injury caused by obstacles to trade. The complainant alleged that the U.S. subsidies caused
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price depression, as well as increased import volumes in the European market.148 However, the
Commission concluded that the evidence at that time was insufficient to support a final
conclusion on whether the subsidies cause or threaten to cause serious injury.149 Nevertheless,
the Commission is monitoring the evolution of the situation and collecting further evidence on
the possible negative impact of the U.S. subsidies.150 In addition, all of the three other cases in
which the complainants alleged both injury and adverse trade effects lead to confirmative
conclusions.151

4. Adverse trade effects

The complaint lodged on behalf of the Community enterprises shall provide sufficient
evidence of the adverse trade effects caused by the obstacles to trade.152 In such cases, the
148
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Commission shall examine not only the effects to the enterprises on the third country market
caused by the obstacles to trade, but also the impact of such effects on the economy of the
Community, a region of the Community or a sector of economic activity therein.153 The factors
that shall be considered in the determination of “injury” apply here too.154 The rationale behind
the requirement is two-fold. On the one hand, the opening of a third country market does not
necessarily benefit the whole of the EU industry.155 On the other hand, the concept of injury is
inadequate to cover the issues of market access, especially trade opportunities, competitive
relationships and potential trade flows.156 With this requirement, the Commission can filter out
cases that would benefit only the complainant and concentrate on cases which have a broader
impact on the whole Community.157 In practice, satisfying this requirement has not proved to
be particularly onerous.158 First, the Commission tends to extrapolate the adverse trade effects
on the complainant by considering the possible impact of the trade practices on the
Community. 159 Second, this requirement is automatically satisfied when the complainant
represents an entire Community industry, region or sector.160
The TBR identifies two situations where adverse trade effects may arise: (a) trade flows
concerning a product or service are “prevented, impeded or diverted as a result of any obstacle
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to trade”;161 or (b) obstacles to trade have “materially affected the supply or inputs (e.g. parts
and components or raw materials) to Community enterprises.” 162 According to the
investigations that have already been concluded, the adverse trade effects existed in the forms
of loss of export opportunities, decrease in market shares, increase of costs, loss of
competitiveness, loss of profits, etc.163 With regard to the threat of adverse trade effects, the
Commission shall examine “whether it is clearly foreseeable”164 that actual adverse trade
effects will be developed.
To date, U.S.—Restrictions on the prepared mustard165 has been the only case with a
negative conclusion on the determination of adverse trade effects, which was upheld upon
appeal
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wines167 has been the only one case in which the Commission confirmed the existence of a
threat of adverse trade effects within the meaning of Article 2.4 of TBR.168
B. Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules169 in China

There are two substantive requirements in the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation
Rules.170

1. The qualification for the complainants

There are two kinds of complainants under the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules,
domestic enterprises and industry. They are defined as the enterprises or industry directly
concerned with the products or services in question.171

2. Trade barriers
The definition of “trade barriers” contains two elements.172 First, trade barriers refer to the
measures or practices adopted or supported by the governments of foreign countries
(regions).173 Second, these measures or practices either ⑴ violate the economic treaty or
167
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agreement which the country (region) concluded or entered together with China, or fail to fulfill
the obligations under such a trade treaty or agreement;174 or ⑵ cause or may cause one of the
following negative impacts: the products or services of China are prevented or hindered from
entering the market of the country (region) concerned or a third country (region); the
competitiveness of the products or services of China in the market of the country (region)
concerned or a third country (region) is injured; or the products or services of the country
(region) concerned or a third country (region) are prevented or hindered from entering China.175
If the measures or practices concerned fall into the first category, the complaint does not need to
prove the existence of any injury or negative impact caused thereby.176 It can be called
“violation test”. Nevertheless, a measure or practice that does not violate any international
agreement may still constitute trade barrier if it causes or may cause any negative impact
mentioned above.177 It can be called “negative impact test”. The second category includes, but
is not limited to, the non-violation situation in the WTO.

C. Comparison

In both of the pieces of law, the qualification for the complainants focuses on their
relationship with the product or service in question. In comparison, the definition of domestic
enterprises and industry in the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules is too simplified.178
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There are no standards for the determination of domestic enterprise. There is no quantitative
requirement for obtaining standing as an industry. All these ambiguities will give rise to
disputes regarding the standing of complainants in the implementation of the Rules.
Two common elements exist between the definitions of “obstacles to trade” in the TBR
and “trade barrier” in the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules. First, they are both
limited to government trade practices so that private practices are excluded.179 Second, they
both cover violation and non-violation situations. This complies with the provisions on the
types of complaints in WTO agreements.180
Nevertheless, there also exist differences between the two definitions. First, their overall
coverage is different. The definition of “obstacles to trade” in the TBR has a direct and
exclusive link with international trade rules, especially those contained in WTO agreements.181
According to this definition, only those trade practices “in respect of which international trade
rules establish a right of action” may be deemed as obstacles to trade.182 Therefore, it excludes
the situation where the EU determines the existence of obstacles to trade according to its own
standards. The definition of “trade barrier” in the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules
seems broader than “obstacles to trade”. It contains not only trade practices violating economic
treaties
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Therefore, a trade practice that has not yet been subject to any international trade rules may also
constitute a trade barrier if it satisfies the “negative impact test”.
Second, the coverage of the government practices in the two definitions may be different.
The TBR limits “obstacles to trade” to the measures or practices adopted or maintained by a
third country,184 whereas the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules limits “trade barrier”
to the measures or practices adopted or supported by the governments of foreign countries
(regions).185 It is evident that two different words are used in the two definitions, namely,
“maintained” and “supported”. No further explanation was given for the two words in the legal
texts. The ambiguity may give rise to disagreement on the coverage of government practices.
According to the New Oxford American Dictionary, the relevant meaning of “maintain” is to
cause or enable a state of affairs to continue.186 The relevant meaning of “support” is to give
assistance to someone or something, especially financially.187 Accordingly, no matter how the
authorities will interpret the two words, the bottom line is that the government must at least
play a certain positive role in the practices. Therefore, private practices merely tolerated by a
government should certainly not be deemed as maintained or supported by a government.188 To
date, no case under the TBR or Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules has ever touched
this issue.189 Nevertheless, there was a relevant case under the TBR’s predecessor NCPI.190
184
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This case involved unauthorized reproduction of sound recordings by individuals in
Indonesia.191 These piracy activities were alleged to be tolerated, and in fact taxed, by the
Indonesian government.192 Under the NCPI, illicit commercial practices are defined as “any
international trade practices attributable to third countries which are incompatible with
international law or with the generally accepted rules.” 193 The Commission therefore
concluded that there existed prima facie evidence for the existence of illicit commercial
practices.194 This case was probably the most controversial under the NCPI.195 Had it been
brought under the TBR, it would have been difficult for the complaint to be admitted.196
Apart from the existence of obstacles to trade, there is another element for complaints
under the TBR to prove: That is “injury” for the Community industry or “adverse trade effects”

the scheme violates Artcile 9.1 (c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. Article 9.1 of the Agreement on
Agriculture lists 6 kinds of export subsidies which shall be subject to reduction commitments.
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for the Community enterprises.197 It is reasonable to set different burden of proof for the two
kinds of complainants since their qualifications are different. Nevertheless, there have been few
cases initiated on behalf of Community industry because both the standing requirement and the
“injury” test are difficult to satisfy. There has been a proposal recommending that EU enterprise
is sufficiently flexible and wide in scope to represent the whole private sector as the
complainant under the TBR. 198 Under the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules,
domestic enterprises and industry bear the same burden of proof. There also exists a problem.
Since it is easier to obtain standing as an enterprise, it would be hardly possible that a
complainant would take the trouble to obtain standing as an industry. Therefore, it would make
useless the provisions on industry complainants.
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Chapter V. Post-Examination Procedure and Follow-Up Actions

A. Trade Barriers Regulation199 in the European Union

The TBR investigations may lead to three options, namely, suspension of the procedure,
adoption of commercial policy measures or termination of the procedure.200

1. Suspension of the procedure

Suspension of the TBR procedure may be provoked in two situations: (a) the measures
taken by the third country or countries are satisfactory, and therefore no action by the
Community is needed;201 or (b) it appears that the most appropriate means to resolve the issue
is to conclude an agreement with the third country or countries concerned.202 In the former
situation, the application of the measures shall be monitored by the Commission and action may
be taken if “the measures have been rescinded, suspended or improperly implemented.”203
There is no time limit for the negotiation of an agreement or suspension of the procedure.
As the overriding objective of the TBR is to remove obstacles to trade as soon as possible,
a negotiated solution is preferred by the Commission for its flexibility and rapidity.204 To date,
199
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bilateral agreements or understandings have been reached in twelve cases.205 In a number of
cases, settlements were reached only after the EU requested consultations within the WTO.206

2. Adoption of commercial policy measures

Commercial policy measures may be taken when the Commission considers them
necessary in the interests of the Community in order to remove the obstacles to trade.207 If the
Community’s international obligations require “the prior discharge of an international
procedure for consultation or for the settlement of disputes,”208 such a procedure shall be
followed prior to the adoption of commercial policy measures.209 No time period is provided
in the TBR for the activation of formal dispute settlement procedures under the WTO or other
applicable trade agreements. Furthermore, commercial policy measures should be compatible
with the EU’s existing international obligations and procedure.210 The TBR lists three notable
forms of measures: (a) suspension or withdrawal of any trade concession;211 (b) an increase of
existing customs duties or introduction of any other charge on imports;212 (c) introduction of
quantitative restrictions or any other measures on imports or exports.213
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In the past TBR cases, the WTO has been the exclusive forum for dispute settlement. As
mentioned before, the Commission has requested consultations within the WTO on a number of
occasions. Moreover, WTO panel proceeding has been triggered in five cases.214

3. Termination of the procedure

When the Commission found as a result of the examination procedure that the interests of
the Community do not require any action to be taken, the procedure shall be terminated with no
further action. 215 U.S.—Restrictions on the prepared mustard 216 has been the only case
terminated due to insufficiency of evidence and lack of EU interest. Moreover, several other
cases were terminated after a mutually agreed solution was reached and no more actions were
needed.217
B. Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules218 in China

1. Suspension of the investigation

The Ministry of Commerce may suspend the investigation in the following situations: ⑴
the government of the country (region) concerned promises to cancel or readjust the measures
or practices within the proper time limit; 219 ⑵ the government of the country (region)
concerned promises to provide China with proper trade compensation within the proper time
214
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limit; 220 ⑶ the government of the country (region) concerned promises to fulfill the
obligations of economic trade treaty or agreement; 221 or ⑷ other situations where the
Ministry of Commerce thinks the investigation may be suspended. 222 Nevertheless, the
Ministry of Commerce may resume the investigation once the foregoing situations disappear.223

2. Termination of the investigation

The investigation may be terminated in the following situations: ⑴the complainant
requests to terminate the investigation unless to do so conflicts with the public interest;224 ⑵
the complainant does not provide proper cooperation during the investigation;225 or ⑶ other
situations where the Ministry of Commerce thinks the investigation may be terminated.226
Furthermore, the Ministry of Commerce shall terminate the investigation in the following
situations: ⑴ the government of the country (region) concerned has canceled or readjusted the
measures or practices under investigation; 227 ⑵ the government of the country (region)
concerned has provided China with proper trade compensation;228 or ⑶ the government of the
country (region) concerned has fulfilled the obligations under the economic trade treaty or
agreement concerned.229
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3. Adoption of measures

Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the Ministry of Commerce shall determine
whether the measures or practices constitute trade barriers and publish the decision thereof.230
If the measures or practices concerned are determined to constitute trade barriers, the
Ministry of Commerce shall take the following activities with consideration of the situation
involved: ⑴ holding bilateral consultations with the country (region) concerned; ⑵ initiating
a multilateral dispute settlement proceeding; or ⑶ other measures as appropriate.231

C. Comparison

As pragmatic policy instruments, both of the procedures prefer mutually acceptable
solutions.232 In order to achieve this
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Initiating multilateral dispute settlement procedures is listed as one follow-up action under
both of the procedures. However, their approaches are different. The TBR clearly provides that
an international dispute settlement procedure shall be followed before the adoption of any
commercial policy measure if the EU’s international obligation requires so. 235 It further
stipulates that any commercial policy measures shall be compatible with existing international
obligations and procedures.236 Such provisions ensure that any action taken under the TBR will
be consistent with international law. To the contrary, the statutory language in the Foreign Trade
Barriers Investigation Rules grants the authorities discretion in the adoption of follow up
measures.237 It does not impose an obligation to follow an international procedure even when
required by China’s obligation under an international agreement. It therefore puts China in a
position of potential breach of its international obligations. According to the Understanding on
Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, a WTO Member shall “have
recourse to and abide by the rules and procedures” provided by it to seek the solution of
disputes arising from another Member’s trade practices falling within the scope of WTO
agreements. 238 In other words, unilateral action is excluded in such situations.
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Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 12.2.
Id. at art. 12.3.
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Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5, at art. 33.
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DSU, supra note 233, at art. 23.
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In this respect, a WTO case is worth mentioning. On February 2, 1999, the European Communities
initiated a dispute challenging the consistency of sections 301-310 of the U.S. Foreign Trade Act of 1974
with U.S. obligations under WTO agreements, in which other 16 WTO member states participated as third
parties. According to the Panel, the statutory language of Sections 304, 305 and 306 allows the USTR to
exercise its discretion contrary to U.S. obligations under Article 23 of the DSU, therefore constituting a
prima facie violation of Article 23. Nevertheless, the Panel noted that the U.S. Administration had pledged
in the SAA, and before the Panel, that it would not exercise its discretion contrary to its obligations under
Article 23. The Panel held that these undertakings effectively and legally curtailed the offending
discretionary element, and therefore removed the prima facie WTO inconsistencies created by the statutory
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Member State of WTO, China is obligated to have recourse to WTO dispute settlement
proceeding with regards to any dispute falling within the scope of WTO agreements.

The

Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules should be revised so as to be consistent with such
an obligation.

language of Sections 301-310. Thus, the Panel found that Sections 304(a)(2)(A), 305(a) and 306(b) of the
U.S. Trade Act of 1974 were not inconsistent with Article 23.2(a) or (c) of the DSU or with any of the
GATT 1994 provisions cited. However, the panel stated that should those undertakings be repudiated or in
any other way removed, its findings of conformity would no longer be warranted. The DSB adopted the
panel report at its meeting on January 27, 2000. See Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the
Trade Act of 1974, WT/DS152/R (Dec. 22, 1999).
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Chapter VI. Judicial Review

A. Trade Barriers Regulation240 in the European Union

Throughout the TBR procedure, the Commission has to make decisions on a number of
issues.241 All of these decisions may not be necessarily agreeable to the complainants and other
persons concerned. Although the EC Treaty includes provisions of judicial review against the
Commission’s decisions,242 the TBR contains no parallel provisions. The question of whether
the Commission’s decisions could be brought for judicial review, was answered in the case
FICF v. Commission of the European Communities.243 In this case, the Court of First Instance
found that, the procedural safeguards in the TBR show that “a complainant under Article 4 has
the right to submit for review by the Court any decision of the Commission terminating an
examination procedure initiated as a result of his complaint.” 244 The allegations of the
applicants in this case covered violations of Article 2.1, 2.4, 8.5, 8.8, 10.5, 11.1245 of the
TBR.246 However, the Court of First Instance rejected all the allegations.247
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Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4.
These issues include the admissibility of the complaint, initiation of dispute settlement procedure,
termination or suspension of procedure, and adoption of commercial policy measures.
EC Treaty, supra note 83, at article 230.
FICF v. Commission of the European Communities, supra note 166, at ¶ 41.
Id.
Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4, at art. 2.1, 2.4, 8.5, 8.8, 10.5, 11.1.
Id. at ¶ 43.
Id. at ¶ 202.
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B. Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules248 in China

There are two kinds of remedies available for the complainant and other persons
concerned who disagree with the decisions made pursuant to the Foreign Trade Barriers
Investigation Rules. One is administrative review,249 and the other is judicial review.250 The
complainant or other persons concerned have the option to choose whichever they like. If they
are not satisfied with the decision of administrative review, they can still submit the issue for
judicial review.251 The judgment in judicial review is final.252 The request of administrative
review shall be submitted to the Department of Treaty and Law within the Ministry of
Commerce.253 The request of judicial review shall be submitted to the Intermediate People’s
Court for the first instance.254 So far, no administrative review or judicial review has ever been
requested.
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Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, supra note 5.
Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Xing Zheng Fu Yi Fa ［Administrative Review Law］(promulgated by
the Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 29, 1999, effective Oct. 1, 1999), art. 6, 1999 STANDING COMM. NAT’L
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visited Mar. 16, 2006) (P.R.C.).
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Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 250, at art. 60.
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Shang Wu Bu Xing Zheng Fu Yi Shi Shi Ban Fa［Implementation Measures for Administrative
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Chapter VII. Implementation of the Law

A. Trade Barriers Regulation255 in the European Union

1. An overview

Considering the TBR as an important instrument to implement the new Market Access
Strategy,256 the Commission is actively inviting the European enterprises to lodge complaints
on unfair foreign trade practices pursuant to it. In order to help identify trade barriers that
hamper European enterprises in third countries, the Commission has set up a comprehensive
market access database.257 Through the database, the Commission also intends to maintain a
continuous three-way exchange of information between the EU institutions, Member States and
European business.258 In order to improve transparency, the Commission not only publishes the
notices of initiation of TBR examination procedures in the Official Journal of the European
Communities, but also puts them on the website of the Directorate-General for Trade.259
Moreover, the Commission released a model complaint on the website of Directorate-General
255

Council Regulation 3286/94, supra note 4.
Supra note 7.
257
EU Market Access, http://mkaccdb.eu.int (last visited Mar. 16, 2006). The Database provides a wide range
of market access information, including economic and regulatory information, applied tariff levels and
analyses of trade issues, and the material is updated regularly throughout the year.
258
Michael Sanchez Rydelshi, G.A.V.R.Zonnekeyn, The EC Trade Barriers Regulation: The EC’s move
towards a more aggressive market access strategy, 31(5) J. OF WORLD TRADE 147, 160 (1997).
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EUROPA I-Centre, http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/cfm/doclib_search.cfm?action=search (last visited Mar. 16,
2006). The notices of initiation and investigation reports after 1997 could be searched through this engine.
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for Trade so as to make the preparation of complaints much easier.260 These efforts have not
been without avail. The TBR has so far been a success as evidenced by the Commission.261 As
of the end of 2005, the Commission had launched 24 investigations in response to petitions
lodged by the private sector.262 Generally, a satisfactory outcome could be secured either
through bilateral consultation or WTO dispute settlement proceeding.263 The following case
will illustrate how the TBR is an efficient private sector tool to press the Commission to remove
foreign trade barriers.
2. A successful case under the TBR: U.S.—Anti-dumping Act of 1916264
The case concerning the 1916 U.S. Antidumping Act265 (hereinafter referred to as 1916
Act) was the first TBR case which led to a WTO panel request.266 But for the complaint filed
by the European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries (hereinafter referred to as
EUROFER)267, it would have been hardly possible for the Commission to challenge the 1916
Act, although it is inconsistent with the WTO’s antidumping rules.268
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Model TBR Complaint, http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2006/february/trade_127354.pdf (last visited Mar.
16, 2006).
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Eeckhaute, supra note 50, at 209.
262
For detailed information regarding the cases, please refer to the annex.
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Eeckhaute, supra note 50, at 212.
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Founded in 1976, European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries is composed of steel companies
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On January 10, 1997, EUROFER, on behalf of its members, lodged a complaint pursuant to
Article 4 of TBR.269 The complaint alleged that the 1916 Act is inconsistent with several WTO
provisions, namely Article III, VI of GATT,270 Articles 1, 18.4, 9.3, 10, 5, 2, 3, 11.1 of the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994271 (hereinafter referred to as Antidumping Agreement) and Article XVI:4272 of the WTO
Agreement.273 According to the complaint, there were two main adverse trade effects of the U.S.
practice. Firstly, third-country steel producers may divert their exports to the EU or other third
countries where the Community industry has export interests.274 Second, U.S. trading companies
and user industries may shift to purchase domestic U.S. products rather than imported products
alleged to be dumping.275
After consultation with the TBR Committee, the Commission decided that the complaint
contained “sufficient prima facie evidence to justify the opening of an investigation into the U.S.
practice complained of.” 276 In accordance with the Article 8.1(a) of the TBR, 277 the
Commission published a Notice of Initiation of an examination procedure regarding this matter
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Notice of Initiation of an Examination Procedure Concerning an Obstacle to Trade within the Meaning of
Council Regulation No 3286/94 - Failure of the United States of America to Repeal the Antidumping Act
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GATT, supra note 134, at art. III, IV.
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on February 25, 1997.278 The notice set the time limit for public comment and request for a
hearing as “not later than 30 days following the publication of the notice.”279 During the
investigation, the Commission had preliminary informal contacts with the United States Trade
Representative on April 8, 1997.280 The Commission also forwarded a questionnaire to the U.S.
government,281 which concerned various aspects of the 1916 Act, including its relationship with
the WTO Agreements and the U.S. Uruguay Round Agreements Act.282 After receiving the U.S.
reply, the Commission sent further written inquiry in order to clarify the matters not sufficiently
explained in the U.S. reply. However, the Commission received no response from the U.S.
authorities.283 Consequently, another set of written questions was sent to the U.S. authorities on
July 25, 1997, which was only replied to on September 8, 1997.284
Having completed the investigation in accordance with Article 8 of the TBR, 285 the
Commission published a report to declare its conclusion.286 In this report, the Commission
confirmed most of the complaint’s allegations of WTO violations, and the existence of an
obstacle within the meaning of the TBR.287 The Commission also affirmed that the complainant
278
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suffered “adverse trade effects as a result of the U.S. practice, and further adverse effects on the
complainant’s activity and the overall Community economy are threatened.”288 Based on the
above findings, the Commission decided that the Community had a right of action under the
relevant WTO rules within the meaning of Article 2.1 of the TBR. 289 Accordingly, the
Commission informed the Member States of its intent to pursue the matter with the U.S.
authorities, if necessary, within the WTO framework.290
On June 4, 1998, the European Communities291 (hereinafter EC) requested consultations
with the U.S. regarding this issue in accordance with Article 4 of the DSU,292 Article XXIII of
the GATT 1994293 and Article 17.3 of the Antidumping Agreement.294 On July 29, 1998, the
EC and U.S. held a consultation on this matter in Geneva, which did not lead to a satisfactorily
resolution.295 The EC therefore requested the establishment of a panel on November 12, 1998 in
accordance with Article 6.2 of DSU and Article XXIII of the GATT 1994.296 A Panel was

VI of GATT 1994, Article 2, 3, 5.4, 9of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement, as well as Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement, which constitute international trade rules conferring to the Community a right of action
under Article 2(1) of the TBR. ⑵1916 Act is also inconsistent with the Article III:4 of GATT 1994, in that
it is discriminatory against the internal sale of foreign products after importation. Therefore, Article III:4 of
GATT 1994 appeared to be another international trade rule possibly conferring to the Community a right of
action under Article 2(1)of the TBR. ⑶ In the domestic law system of the U.S., 1916 Act prevails over the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act and WTO provisions in case of conflict.
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composed on April 1, 1999. In its report297 dated March 31, 2000, the panel found that 1916 Act
violated the Article VI:1, VI:2 of the GATT 1994,298 Articles 1, 4 and 5.5 of the Anti-Dumping
Agreement, 299 and Article XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement. 300 On May 29, 2000, the U.S.
appealed to the Appellate Body certain issues of law covered in the panel report.301 Nevertheless,
the Appellate Body report upheld all of the findings and conclusions of the panel that were
appealed.302
Having failed to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with the U.S. in the reasonable period of
time for the implementation, the EC requested arbitration on this issue pursuant to Article 21.3 of
DSU.303 The award determined that the reasonable period of time would expire on July 26,
2001, 304 which was extended to December 20, 2001 upon the agreement of EC. 305 Still
unsatisfied with the implementation by the U.S., the EC adopted a regulation306 in 2003, which
prohibits enforcement of any U.S. court decision under the 1916 Act and allows any EC
company sued under the Act to counter-sue in the EC for damages. In 2004, the EC further
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requested that the Dispute Settlement Body authorize it to suspend the application of obligations
under GATT 1994 and the Antidumping Agreement.307 Therefore, another arbitration under
Article 22.6 of DSU308 was requested on this matter and the EC was authorized to suspend the
obligations at a quantified level not exceeding that of the nullification or impairment caused by
the U.S. practice.309 Finally, in the second week of October 2004, the repeal of the 1916 Act was
attached to a miscellaneous trade bill and signed into law on December 3, 2004.310 The 1916 Act
is therefore fully repealed but the pending cases are allowed to proceed.311
B. Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules312 in China

1. An overview

The Ministry of Commerce has made big efforts to promote the enforcement of the
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules. In order to improve enterprises’ awareness of
foreign trade barrier, the Ministry maintains on its official website a database containing general
information as well as alerting information on foreign trade barriers.313 There is also a channel
on this website for industries and enterprises to report information relevant to trade barriers to
307
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the Ministry of Commerce.314 Moreover, the Ministry of Commerce provides various training
opportunities regarding foreign trade barriers for the local government agencies, industry
associations and enterprises.
What is more important is the establishment of an interactive mechanism among the
central government, local government agencies, industry associations and enterprises.315 Under
this mechanism, the four parties have separate responsibilities whereas they cooperate with
each other. The central government is responsible for negotiation and dispute settlement with
foreign countries so as to create and maintain a level playing field for domestic enterprises. The
local government agencies are responsible for promoting information exchange between central
government and private sector, carrying out or assisting in investigations, participating in
negotiation with foreign countries, etc. The industry associations’ role is especially important in
the mechanism. They are the guard of their member enterprises’ interests. They can file
complaints on behalf of member enterprises. They can provide technical assistance for member
enterprises. They are an important medium for the information exchange and collection. They
can also play an active role in negotiations with foreign countries. The enterprises are directly
interested parties in challenging foreign trade barrier. They are the sources of first-hand
information needed in the investigation. They are also the most vigilant in highlighting the
unfair trade practice in foreign countries.
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2006).

50
There has been only one investigation so far initiated under the Foreign Trade Barriers
Investigation Rules that is illustrated below.

2. A successful

case

under

the

Foreign

Trade

Barriers

Investigation

Rules:

Japan—Measures Restricting the Import of Laver316

Japan has the biggest consumer market for laver in the world, with a consumption need of
about 10 billion pieces of laver and laver processed products per year.317 However, the import
of these products to Japan is subject to quotas, which had been granted only to Korea for a long
period of time. Chinese laver exporters had never obtained such quotas before this case.318
On February 25, 2004, Jiangsu Province Laver Association filed a complaint concerning
Japan’s measures restricting the import of laver and laver processed products pursuant to the
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules.319 The complainant alleged that Japan’s quota
measures on the import of laver violated certain provisions of relevant WTO agreement and
prevented Chinese laver from entering Japanese market. 320 The complainant therefore
contended that the Japan’s measures constituted a foreign trade barrier.321
The Ministry of Commerce considered that the complaint met the requirement imposed by
the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules and therefore initiated an investigation on April
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22, 2004.322 A notice of initiation of this investigation was published on the Gazette of the
Ministry of Commerce, which set the time limit for the interested parties and public to submit
written review as 30 days within the publication of the notice.323 The Ministry of Commerce
also notified the complainant and Japanese government of the decision. 324 Afterwards,
questionnaires were sent to the relevant Japanese government agencies and domestic enterprises
respectively.325 The Ministry of Commerce also sent staff to Japan to collect information and
evidence.326 Furthermore, the two countries held three rounds of negotiations in which Japan
finally promised to take measures to resolve this issue.327 With the aim of pursuing mutually
satisfactory solution, the Ministry of Commerce decided to suspend the investigation. 328
Through the negotiation afterwards, Japan adjusted the measures concerned. On February 21,
2005, Japan declared the import quota plan for laver in 2005, which cancelled the limitation on
the origin of laver and laver processed products.329 That is to say, Japan opened its market to
Chinese laver. Consequently, the Ministry of Commerce terminated the investigation pursuant
to the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules.330 The effect of the case is immediate. On
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July 3, 2005, 60 million pieces of laver departed from Nantong for Japan for the first time.331
In 2005, the total amount of laver export from Jiangsu Province soared by 70 times.332

C. Comparison

The authorities in both the EU and China have played an active role in the implementation
of the law. They have done a lot of things in order to improve the private sector’s awareness of
the two procedures. Although the two procedures are not the only path leading to the elimination
of foreign trade barriers, their function of forging public-private partnership is undeniable.333
Admittedly, there exist some challenges, especially in China, if this function has to be fully
realized. Chinese firms tend to be more wary of litigation. They are still not comfortable with
employing private law firms to work with trade officials in challenging foreign trade barriers.
Moreover, China still lacks legal expertise in WTO law.334 The capacity to organize information
concerning trade barriers also has to be improved. All of these problems are what the Chinese
government should confront in the future.
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Chapter VIII. Conclusions

As discussed above, many similarities exist between the TBR and Foreign Trade Barriers
Investigation Rules. They both establish a procedure for the private sector to petition the
government to challenge foreign trade barriers. Both procedures apply to violation and
non-violation situations. Both procedures contain similar stages ranging from lodging of a
complaint to the adoption of follow up actions. The complainants and other interested parties in
both procedures are guaranteed certain procedural rights. The authorities under both procedures
have obligations of publishing and informing their decisions so as to improve transparency. In
addition, a mutually agreeable solution is preferred by both procedures.
On the other hand, the two pieces of law differ from each other in some aspects. First, their
coverage is different. The TBR is clearly intended to “ensure the exercise of the Community’s
rights under international trade rules”.335 Therefore, the obstacles to trade include only trade
practice adopted or maintained by a third country in respect of which EU derives a right of
action under international trade rules. In contrast, trade barriers under the Foreign Trade
Barriers Investigation Rules are broader. They cover not only violation and non-violation
situations, but also trade practice that is not yet subject to any international trade rules but
satisfies the “negative impact test.” Second, the TBR clearly states that the EU’s international
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obligations on dispute settlement will be observed in the adoption of commercial policy
measures. Therefore, any action taken pursuant to the TBR will be consistent with international
trade rules. The approach in the Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules deviates from that
of the TBR. It grants the Ministry of Commerce certain discretion to adopt measures. Whether
or not intended, this runs the risk of violating China’s obligations under international
agreements. The third difference exists in the burden of proof for the complainants. Under the
Foreign Trade Barriers Investigation Rules, the complainant’s burden of proof is much lower.
This is reasonable due to lack of expertise and different attitudes towards litigation in China.
In addition, this article suggests some improvements for the Foreign Trade Barriers
Investigation Rules. First, the provisions on the adoption of measures should be modified so as
to be consistent with China’s international obligations on dispute settlement. Second, the
definition of domestic enterprises and industry should be further clarified. Third, a definition of
the term “interested parties” should be added. Fourth, the procedural rights of the complainants
and interested parties should be strengthened.
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Annex: Cases under the TBR336

Symbol/Date
of Initiation
C228/6
Sep.17,2005
C261/3
Oct.23,2004
C3/2
Jul.01,2004

C311/31
Dec.20,2003
C58/3
Mar.13,2003

C124/6
May 25,2002

C215/2
Aug.01,2001
C345/5
Dec.2,2000
C236/4
Aug.18,2000
C340/70
336

Complainants
CEEV &CEPS on
behalf of Community
enterprises
Scotch Whisky Ass’n
on behalf of its 54
member companies
BIPAVER on behalf
of
its
member
companies

Target Country /
Practices
India—Import duties and
restrictions on wines and
spirits
Uruguay—Tax
arrangements concerning
imported whiskies
Brazil—Import ban on
retreaded tyres

EFPIA on behalf of Turkey—Pharmaceutical
Community
products
enterprises
European Oilseed
U.S.—Subsidies
on
Alliance
oilseed production

CIVB on behalf of Canada—Lack
of
Community
protection
of
enterprises
geographical indications
for “Bordeaux” and
“Medoc”.
FICF on behalf of U.S.—Restriction on the
Community
prepared mustard
enterprises
CESA on behalf of Korea—Measures
shipbuilding industry affecting
trade
in
& enterprises
commercial vessels
Volkswagen AG,
Columbia—Tax
Seat SA & Audi AG
discrimination
of
imported motor vehicles
European Apparel & Argentina—Imports of

Actions taken
Investigation
concluded yet.

not

Suspended as a result
of
a
negotiated
resolution.
Consultation/panel
requested but no
panel established yet.
(WT/DS332)
Settlement is being
pursued
through
negotiation.
Situation
being
monitored as a result
of
insufficient
evidence.
Terminated as a result
of a mutually agreed
solution.

Terminated as a result
of
insufficient
evidence.
Panel report adopted.
(WT/DS273/R)
EC prevailed.
Suspended as a result
of a mutually agreed
solution.
Settlement is being

See Official Journal of the European Communities; Trade Barriers Regulation: List of Cases,

http://Europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/tbr/cases/cases_list_en.htm (last visited Mar. 16, 2006).
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Nov.27,1999

Textile Organization
on behalf of
Community
enterprises
EFPIA on behalf of
Community
enterprises
Consorzio
del
Prosciutto di Parma
on behalf of member
companies

textile
and
products

C108/33
Apr.17,1999

Dornier Luftfahrt
GmbH

Brazil—Subsidies
for
export of regional aircraft

C361/13
Nov.24,1998

Cerestar Holding BV
on behalf of member
companies
ANAPA on behalf of
Community industry
and enterprises

Brazil—Import
for sorbitol

C218/3
Jul.30,1999
C176/6
Jun.22,1999

C215/2
Jul.10,1998

clothing pursued
through
negotiation.

Korea—Pricing
and
Reimbursement
of
Pharmaceutical products
Canada—Lack
of
protection
of
geographical indication
for “Prosciutto di Parma”

regime

Chile—Restriction on the
transit and transshipment
of swordfish

C154/12
May 19,1998

Colipa on behalf of Korea—Import
member firms
restriction on cosmetic
products

C63/2
Feb.27,1998
C 197/2
Jun.27,1997

Febeltex on behalf of
Community
enterprises
Eurofer on behalf of
member companies

C 177/5
Jun.11,1997

IMRO on behalf of U.S.—Licensing
member companies
musical works

of

C 110/2

Cotance on behalf of Japan—Imports

of

Brazil—Import regime
for textile products
Brazil—Import licensing
of stainless steel flat
products

Suspended as a result
of measures taken by
Korea.
On hold pending the
outcome
of
the
Canadian
proceedings
concerned.
Terminated as a result
of measures taken by
Brazil.
Suspended as a result
of measures taken by
Brazil.
Constitution of WTO
panel
suspended(WT/DS19
3)
Suspended as a result
of an agreement
reached by the EC
and Korea.
Suspended as a result
of measures taken by
Brazil.
Terminated as a result
of
satisfactory
measures taken by
Brazil; Consultation
requested but no
panel
established(WT/DS1
16).
Panel report adopted
(WT/DS160/R). EC
prevailed.
Consultation

57
Apr.9,1997

Community
enterprises

C 103/3
Apr.2, 1997

BNIC on behalf of Brazil—Cognac
Community
appellation of origin
enterprises

C 59/6
Feb.26,1997

Cotance on behalf of
Community
enterprises
Eurofer on behalf of
member companies

C 58/14
Feb.25,1997
C351/6
Nov.22,1996

finished leather

Argentina—Exports of
hides and imports of
finished leather
U.S.—Antidumping Act
of 1916

Federtessile on behalf U.S.— Rules of origin
of
Community for textile products
enterprises

requested but no
panel
established.
(WT/DS147)
Terminated as a result
of
satisfactory
measures taken by
Brazil.
Panel report adopted.
(WT/DS155/R) EC
prevailed.
AB report adopted.
(WT/DS136/AB/R)
EC prevailed.
Consultation
requested(WT/DS85)
; Solution reached
through negotiation.
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